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Article 3

REORGANIZATION UNDER THE AMENDED
BANKRUPTCY ACT
In an effort to lessen the severity of the depression, a new
relationship between debtors and their creditors was evolved
in the form of an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, which
established Chapter VIII, entitled "Provisions for the relief
of Debtors." The need for this new form of relief became
more and more apparent as the depression wore on and equities vanished. The losses and the stagnation of business were
so terrific that many debtors who were substantial men, farmers and merchants and many business corporations, as well
as railroads and municipalities, found their reserves and assets so frozen and diminished in value that they were unable
to meet their debts as they matured. Creditors, whose securities were seemingly well secured when made, found that they
were unable to liquidate their securities, except at a tremendous sacrifice.
A feeling became general among creditors that maybe the
debtor was not entirely to blame after all, and -thatif he were
given an opportunity to continue business in a normal way
he could run the business and eventually liquidate it to a
greater advantage for -the creditors than could the creditors
themselves. In many instances it was good business for the
creditor to go along with the debtor, and in many instances
also this program kept the debtor from having the stigma of
bankruptcy attached to his name, and enabled the creditor
to realize far more than he otherwise would have realized.
It was found, however, in most cases, that some of the
creditors would withhold their cooperation with the thought
that they would be granted an advantage by having their
claims bought up, either by the creditors or by the debtor.
In many instances it proved to be better to buy off these
small minority holders rather than to have expensive litigation, with the probable attendance of liquidation. This, how-
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ever, was not fair as far as the other creditors were concerned,
and it became increasingly apparent that some legislation
was needed which would make these minority creditors go
along with the program agreed upon by the debtor and the
majority creditors if the program was fair and feasible.
Up until that time there was no law which could compel a
creditor to go along with the other creditors. Minority mortgage bondholders effectively and often unwittingly, to the
detriment of -themselves and all other bondholders, would
hold up the completion of the foreclosure of the mortgage
securing their bonds because of their failure to join with
other bondholders in making a bid for the property. In those
instances where the holders of a majority of the bonds, usually acting through a Bondholders' Protective Committee,
were unable to raise a substantial amount of cash in order to
pay the nonconsenting bondholders their share of the amount
to be bid for the property, the foreclosure proceedings could
not be completed. It was only, when substantially all of the
bondholders cooperated with one another in making a bid for
the property being foreclosed, or where the bondholders purchased or acquired, under a Plan, the title to the property
and the junior liens, that it was possible to complete the foreclosure. It can readily be seen that the minority creditors or
bondholders prevented all of the bondholders from getting
the benefit of the security on which they presumably held a
first mortgage.
Businesses which needed a breathing spell, in order to liquidate their assets in an orderly manner and to get their
houses in order, found themselves unable to do so because of
a relatively few creditors who were either taking pot-shots in
the form of judgments and levies with their attendant expenses, or were threatening to do so to the detriment of the
business which then found itself unable to secure any new
capital, or even to secure loans.
Hardly a property which had been built during the boom
days and which was financed by a large first mortgage bond
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issue was free from default. In the case of many of these
buildings, probably most of them, the cost of the building
and the land was greatly in excess of the bond issue. With
the depression came low rents, which made it impossible for
the property owner to pay even taxes, and which resulted in
the reduction of the market value of the property to such an
extent that the first mortgage bond issue greatly exceeded
the market value. Market values did not properly approximate the real values of the properties. The scarcity of purchasers generally enabled a few buyers to acquire properties
at their own figure, far below the cost of the properties a few
years before. To be forced to sell in such a market, was certain to result in a complete loss to the debtor and a substantial loss to the creditors.
The problems, therefore, resolved themselves down to a
point where the debtor and his or its creditors could advantageously discuss the conditions in which they mutually
found themselves and endeavor to work out a solution which
would avoid the tremendous losses which would otherwise
ensue. Legislation was needed to force the minority creditors
to go along with the majority, and thereby prevent such minority creditors from obtaining an advantage over the other
creditors.
In 1932 the Hastings Bill was introduced in the Senate by
Senator Hastings of Delaware. It proposed to completely
revise the bankruptcy procedure, and Section 75 of that Bill
provided for corporate reorganizations. Because of the magnitude of the job of revising the entire Bankruptcy Act, it
was decided to abandon this Bill, but to embody in separate
bills certain of its proposals which were for the relief of
debtors.
On March 3, 1933, Section 73, which carried with it Sections 74, 75, 76 and 77, were added to the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 75 of the abandoned Hastings' Bill was rewritten and
introduced by Representative McEwen in 1933. The McEwen Bill passed the House at the special session, but was
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lost in the shuffle in the Senate, because of the rush of business at the end of the special session. It was, however, passed
at the second session and became a law on June 7, 1934,
known as Sections 77A and 77B. Its provisions resemble the
provisions of Section 77, which provide for railroad reorganizations. It also was modeled after similar English and Canadian Statutes.
Municipalities were also unable, in many instances, to pay
their debts as they matured, and there was need for a procedure which would force the minority creditors to go along
with a plan approved by the majority of the creditors and
the Court. To accomplish this end, Chapter IX was added
which was entitled "Provisions for the Emergency Temporary Aid of Insolvent Public Debtors and to Preserve the
Assets Thereof, and for Other Related Purposes." Under
this Chapter, Sections 78, 79 and 80 were added to the Bankruptcy Act, by the Act of May 24, 1934. This Act, however,
was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement
DistrictNo. One.'

At the last session of the Congress, Chapter X, creating an
additional jurisdiction to provide for the composition of the
indebtedness of certain municipal bodies, was enacted on
August 17, 193.7, which added Sections 81, 82, 83 and 84 to
the Bankruptcy Act. Section 84 provides that the jurisdiction under Section 81 of Chapter X should be limited to proceedings initiated on or prior to June 30, 1940.
Section 73 grants to courts of bankruptcy, in addition to
the jurisdiction exercised in voluntary and involuntary proceedings to adjudge persons bankrupt, original jurisdiction in
proceedings for the relief of debtors, as provided in Sections
74, 75 and 77 of the Act.
Section 74 is for the relief of debtors who are individuals,
and it provides in part that any person may file a petition or,
1 298 U. S. 513, 56 S. Ct. 892 (1936),
U. S. 619.

petition for rehearing denied, 2991
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in an involuntary proceeding before adjudication, an answer,
accompanied in either case, unless further time is granted, by
Schedules, and stating in such petition or answer that he is
insolvent or unable to meet his debts as they mature, and
that he desires to make a composition with his creditors or
to secure an extension of time to pay his debts.
Section 75 was designed to enable a farmer to effect a composition or an extension of time, which if accepted by a majority of the creditors in number and amount would be binding upon the other creditors. This relief, however, was not
considered to be sufficient for the farmers for the reason that
about all that could be accomplished was an extension of
time because of the provisions of the Act to the effect that
the lien of a secured creditor could not be reduced or impaired. Then, too, the secured indebtedness of the farmer
was usually held by a relatively few creditors who were in a
position to veto any attempt of a farmer to benefit under
this Section.
In order to cure this defect, an amendment was enacted in
1934, adding Section 75(s) to Section 75, which amendment
was known as the "Frazier-Lemke Act." This amendment in
effect only could be invoked after an attempt had been made
to bring about a composition under Section 75, and if unsuccessful, the farmer could then petition to have his property
appraised and could be given a period of time within which
to purchase it at the appraised value and he could also continue in possession by paying a relatively small rental therefor. This Act was declared unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford.2
In order to meet the objections raised by the Supreme
Court, a new Sub-Section (s) was substituted for the invalid
2 295 U. S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854, 97 A. L. R. 1106 (1935), reheating denied,
296 U. S. 661.
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Frazier-Lenrke Act by the 74th Congress on August 28, 1935.
The constitutionality of the new Sub-Section (s) has not
been passed upon.
Section 76 merely provides that the relief for individuals
and farmers should extend the obligation of any person who
is secondarily liable for or who has insured or guaranteed the
debt or debts, or any part thereof. Section 77 provides for
the reorganization of railroads engaged in interstate commerce. Section 77A grants to courts of bankruptcy original
jurisdiction in proceedings for the relief of debtors, as provided in Section 77B of the Act.
Section 77B, as stated before, provides for the reorganization of any corporation which could become a bankrupt under
Section 4 of the Act and any railroad or other transportation
corporation, except a railroad corporation authorized to file
a petition or answer under the provisions of Section 77 of the
Act. Section 77B completed the provisions for the relief of
private debtors. The new Chapters IX and X previously
have been discussed.
At first Section 74 was very popular and its benefits were
invoked by a large number of property owners, against whose
property foreclosure proceedings had been instituted, with
the hope that some relief might be granted. In the majority
of instances, however, the debtors filing under Section 74,
were without cash and were unable to meet the requirements
of the Act, which provided that before a composition or extension could be confirmed, it was necessary to deposit, with
the clerk of the court, cash to take care of all taxes and prior
charges and administration expenses, as well as the attorneys' fees. A decision finding that it was improper to use the
rents which had been collected during the proceedings to
make such deposit, sounded the death-knell of a number of
the proceedings. A further provision of this Section of the
Act, which made it of little value to a lot of debtors, was the
provision that no plan of composition or extension could be
proposed which in any way disturbed the lien securing se-
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cured claims. So it was impossible to reduce the principal
amount of outstanding secured indebtedness and there was
some question as to whether or not the interest which had
accrued on the bonds could properly be reduced under the
provisions of Section 74, inasmuch as the interest, as well as
the principal, was secured by the property.
Two very interesting experiences which we had under Section 74 might be of interest. A client who owned a grain
elevator and was engaged in the grain business awoke one
day to find himself owing about $50,000, with assets of not
more than $15,000. He readily acceded to the wishes of certain of his creditors and turned over all of his assets to a
Creditors' Committee for the purpose of liquidation. The
Creditors' Committee found, however, that it was unable to
represent all of the creditors, and in order to effect a sale of
the grain elevator it hit upon the supposed short cut of an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against our client. As
soon as the petition was filed, we immediately filed an answer
under the provisions of Section 74 of the amended Bankruptcy Act, and within about two months thereafter we had
the client back in the grain business, operating his elevator
under a temporary lease, and within four or five months we
had a plan of composition and extension approved by a majority in number and amount of his creditors. Under the
plan the secured claims were to be paid off out of the rents
arising out of the use of the elevator, and the unsecured
claims were to be paid off over a period of five years time.
To date the creditors have received more than they possibly
could have received in the event the bankruptcy had been
completed and they still hold the same security and position
with reference to the assets which otherwise would have been
sold. Our client has again gained the confidence of the people
of his community and from recent reports is making good.
The other interesting experience under Section 74 did not
result in a confirmed proposal for extension or composition,
but did result in a distinct benefit to our client as will be
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seen. This client had signed a note for about $250,.00, which
was secured by stock of his Company which had a reputed
value of about $750,000. The holder of the note also held
obligations of the Company to the extent of approximately
$250,000, in addition to the indebtedness against our client.
The note payable by our client was due the day following the
day he engaged us to represent him. He had been advised
that if a breathing spell of a week or ten days could be had,
a certain party would take over the loans and extend the time
of payment. It also had been suggested to the client that
under the circumstances it should be possible to get an injunction in the state court to restrain the holder of the note
from selling the collateral. You know, of course, that it is
elementary that you cannot secure an injunction merely because you do not want to pay an indebtedness on the particular day it is due, and because you want additional time to
try to get together money to enable you to pay. We advised
the gentleman that if he were willing to take a chance of
being declared a bankrupt in the event hecould not conclude
a plan of composition and extension, we were confident that
we could get a stay of sale for at least thirty days by the
filing of a petition for composition and extension under Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act. He readily consented and we
immediately prepared the petition for composition and extension, an order approving the same, a petition for a restraining
order to restrain the holder of the note from selling the collateral, and a restraining order. Within four hours after the
client had called upon us and had first discussed the matter
with us, we filed the petition and were fortunate enough to
be able to have a judge pass upon it at once and enter an
order approving the same and also to issue the restraining
order. The next morning we served the holder of the note
with a copy of the restraining order.
Strenuous efforts were made by the holder of the note to
have the restraining order set aside, but each time the court
granted us time in which to prepare our schedules and to
endeavor to fashion a plan of composition or extension. Rath-
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er than to be further delayed, the holder of the note offered
$25,000 in cash, and agreed to assume certain guaranties and
company indebtedness which our client owed, in consideration of the dismissal of the Section 74 proceedings and of an
assignment of all interest which our client had in the collateral. This proved to be a very fine settlement because the
parties who were endeavoring to get a refinancing loan found
themselves unable to do so. Were it not for our ability to
take advantage of Section 74 in the way we did, the collateral would have been bought in by the holder of the note at
a price far below the amount of the indebtedness which
would have burdened our client, not only with a total loss,
but also with a large deficiency.
A number of clients who were the owners of real estate
wanted us to commence proceedings under Section 74 in
order to bring about a reorganization of their real estate. We
pointed out to them the serious limitations of Section 74 as
compared to Section 77B and advised them to have corporations formed and have their real estate conveyed to these
corporations and then to have the corporations petition for
corporate reorganization under Section 77B. It was then the
feeling of a great number of lawyers that such a procedure
would be ineffective in view of a decision of the United
States Supreme Court to the effect that an individual could
not form a corporation for the purpose of invoking the equity
jurisdiction of the court for the appointment of a receiver.
We maintained that it was the purpose of Congress to get
properties and businesses of all kinds back in commerce and
that the courts would be liberal in this viewpoint. In every
proceeding of this kind that we commenced we always set
forth in the petition a recital to the effect that the corporation had been formed for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Section 77B. Our judgment in this regard was
later confirmed by the decision in the case of the In re
Knickerbocker Hotel Company,' which held that a corpora3 81 Fed. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
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tion organized solely for the purpose of reorganizing under
Section 77B, could become subject to the jurisdiction of the
court for reorganization if there was a reasonable chance
under the existing circumstances of a reorganization plan
being confirmed.
Section 77B has made it possible to speedily reorganize a
large number of properties which were frozen in foreclosure
proceedings. Many foreclosure proceedings had gone to a
decree, but because of the inability of the Bondholders' Committee to secure the deposit of substantially all of the outstanding bonds, or to acquire all of the junior interests and
the title so as to avoid a redemption, it was impossible for
the foreclosure proceedings to be completed. Foreclosure
sales are supposedly for cash, and therefore, it is necessary
to provide cash for that part of the bid allocable on the bonds
which are not held by the successful bidder. Many of the
properties had large amounts of unpaid taxes and had such
impaired income that it was impossible to borrow sufficient
funds to pay the taxes, to pay the costs of the foreclosure
proceedings, and to pay the nondepositing bondholders their
share of the bid price. Under Section 77B it is unnecessary
to raise money for the purpose of paying the nondepositing
bondholders for the reason that the nondepositing bondholders share on a parity with the other bondholders in any plan
which is confirmed, nor to pay the accrued taxes or even to
pay the reorganization expenses. Then too, there is no period
of redemption and no sale of the property.
As soon as a property is reorganized under Section 77B, it
can be made available .immediately for commercial purposes
and free from the jurisdiction of receivers or trustees. Corporations of all kinds found it possible to bring about a reorganization without materially affecting the operation of their
business in the meantime, or of incurring large expenses,
which formerly were incurred in equity receiverships.
Equity receiverships were in common use in reorganizing
business corporations prior to the enactment of Section 77B.
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A nonresident creditor who was friendly to the corporation
would file a petition in the federal court asking for the appointment of a receiver and an order restraining all creditors
from taking any action against the corporation. The corporation would come into court immediately and consent to
the receivership. The court would fix an upset price and a
sale would be held, at which the assets of the corporation
would be acquired under a Plan of Reorganization. The
court was without power to compel the minority to accept a
Plan, and it, therefore, was necessary to allocate the pro rata
part of the upset price applicable on the claims of the minority group. It was impossible for a federal court to appoint a
receiver who could act outside of the district in which he was
appointed. If the property of the corporation extended over
a large area, as is true in the case of many types of organizations, it was necessary to appoint ancillary receivers in each
district in which property of such corporations were located.
Needless to say, this resulted in a tremendous expense and
undue hardship. Under Section 77B the court in which the
petition has been approved has exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and its property wherever located, and, therefore, it
is unnecessary to have ancillary receivers appointed for different jurisdictions.
Jurisdiction of the federal court under Section 77B is invoked either by an original petition filed by the corporation,
which is referred to as the debtor, or by an involuntary original petition filed by three or more creditors holding unsecured claims against the debtor, or its property, in the aggregate amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000), or more,
provided there is either a prior proceeding in bankruptcy or
an equity receivership pending, or an act of bankruptcy
committed by the corporation within four months prior to
the date of the filing, or it may be invoked by an answer filed
in an involuntary proceeding by the debtor before adjudication, or filed in any proceeding pending in bankruptcy. The
petition or answer is then submitted to the court on such
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notice as the court may require and a hearing is had to determine whether or not the petition or answer has been filed in
good faith.
Good faith has been variously defined, but the inclusion of
this term seems to have been made in order to give the court
an opportunity to determine whether under all the circumstances there is a reasonable probability that a Plan of Reorganization will be accepted by the requisite number of creditors and stockholders and confirmed by the court, or whether
the petition or answer has been filed merely to delay creditors.
The jurisdiction of the federal court is complete upon the
entry of an order finding that the petition or answer has been
filed in good faith, and the court thereupon either appoints a
temporary trustee or permits the debtor to remain in possession of its property subject to the order of the court. At this
time the court generally enjoins or stays the commencement
or continuation of suits against the debtor until after the final
decree, and under the Act, the judge requires the debtor, or
the trustee, to give such notice, as the court may direct, to
creditors and stockholders, and to publish a notice of a hearing to be held within thirty (30) days after the appointment
of the temporary trustee or the order continuing the debtor
in possession of its property. At this hearing ,the court may
make permanent the appointment of the trustee, or may
appoint a trustee, if none previously has been appointed, or
may continue the debtor in possession, or place the debtor
again in control of its property.
In the early days of this Amendment attorneys who represented the holders of only a few bonds would occasionally
file involuntary petitions against corporations for reorganization under Section 77B. In the case of 'building corporations,
which have been in foreclosure for a long period of time, it is
difficult, if not impossible in most instances, to find a prior
bankruptcy or equity receivership pending, or an act of bankruptcy committed by the corporation. However, in most of
these instances, there was a receiver appointed by a court of
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equity under the foreclosure proceedings, and the attorneys
would, therefore, allege in their involuntary petitions that
there was a prior equity receivership pending inasmuch as a
receiver had been appointed in the foreclosure proceedings.
They even went so far as to allege in the case of the Granada
Hotel that a mortgagee in possession under the order of a
court of equity in a foreclosure proceeding was equivalent to
a prior equity receivership. However, in the case of Duparquet Huot & M. Co. v. Evans,4 the United States Supreme
Court held that a receiver appointed in a foreclosure proceeding was not a prior equity receivership, and that a prior equity
receivership meant a receivership of the company for the purpose of liquidation of the company, and in the case of Tuttle
v. Harris,' which involves the Granada Hotel, the Supreme
Court said that a mortgagee in possession under the order of
a court of equity in a foreclosure proceeding was not the
equivalent of a prior equity receivership.
A question has been raised as to whether a corporation
which had been dissolved by the state of incorporation more
than two years prior to the date of the institution of either a
voluntary or of an involuntary proceeding under Section 77B
could properly be reorganized. In the case of the In re 211
East Delaware Place Building Corporation6 the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit sustained the jurisdiction of the Court in the case where an involuntary proceeding was brought by creditors against the dissolved corporation. However, in the decision of the United States Supreme Court handed down on November 15, 1937, in the
case of Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Forty-one Thirty7 it was held
Six Wilcox Building Corporation,
that it was improper for a corporation organized in Illinois to institute proceedings for corporate reorganization more than two years
after the corporation had been dissolved.
4 297 U. S. 216, 56 S. Ct. 412 (1935).
5 297 U. S. 225, 56 S. Ct. 416 (1935).
6 76 Fed. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
7 59 S. Ct. 125 (1937), commented on herein, at p. 138.
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We filed a bill to foreclose the lien of a first mortgage on
an office building, which proceeding resulted in a decree
being entered. However, no sale could be held under the
decree because of the fact that the Bondholders' Committee
did not have a sufficient number of bonds, and it was impossible to work out a reorganization with the corporation because of the fact that the corporation previously had been
dissolved. While we were marking time, an involuntary petition was filed under the provisions of Section 77B. An attack
was made on the jurisdiction of the court, but no decision was
ever handed down because it was hoped that Congress would
pass legislation, which was pending, to the effect that creditors might institute proceedings under Section 77B, provided
a receiver had been appointed for 50% or more of the property of the corporation. This proposed legislation was not
passed at the last session of the Congress, but it may be revived at the regular session which commenced in January,
1938. In the meantime, we have decided to endeavor to cure
the lack of jurisdiction of the federal court, by having the decree of dissolution, which had been entered a number of years
ago, vacated, and then by filing an application in the dissolution proceedings for the appointment of a receiver in equity
under the provisions of Sub-Section (d) of Section 157.86 of
the Illinois Business Corporation Act. If a receiver is appointed under the provisions of this Section, it is our opinion
that there will then be a prior equity receivership pending,
and, upon the filing either of a new involuntary petition or an
amended petition reciting the appointment of an equity receiver in the State court, the jurisdiction of the federal court
will not be subject further to question, and the property can
then be reorganized.
At the time of the hearing for the appointment of a permanent trustee, the court generally fixes a time and prescribes the manner for the filing of claims. The Act provides
that any claims not filed within the time fixed by the court,
or such further time as the court might grant, shall be forever
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barred. It is not necessary to wait the customary period prescribed by the old bankruptcy law, but such period of time
can be of such duration as the court may direct.
Under the old bankruptcy practice, certain types of claims,
particularly those arising in tort, were not dischargeable in
bankruptcy. However, under the provisions of Section 77B,
creditors are defined "for all purposes of this Section and of
the reorganization plan, its acceptance and confirmation, all
holders of claims of whatever character against the debtor or
its property, including claims under executory contracts
whether or not such contracts would otherwise constitute
provable claims under this Act." The term "claims" is defined to include "debts, securities, other than stock, liens or
other interest of whatever nature." Even government claims
can be dealt with by the Plan, and a provision is made in the
Act for the approval or nonapproval where monies are due
the Federal Government.
We had occasion to extend the definition of creditors and
claims to probably their broadest sense in proceedings which
we instituted in Ohio, for the reorganization of a corporation
which was the lessee under a ninety-nine year lease. It so
happened that the title to the property was held by a trustee
for the benefit of holders of units of beneficial interest. The
trustee had also issued the ninety-nine year lease as lessor.
The leasehold estate had been mortgaged by the lessee to the
extent of several hundred thousand dollars. The company
was unable to pay the ground rent and the accumulated taxes
and the lessor was threatening to forfeit the lease, which, of
course, would have wiped out the leasehold bondholders, as
well as our clients who were the holders of the stock of the
corporation. It was useless, therefore, to reorganize the corporation unless we could in some way reduce the requirements of the lease. In preparing the petition, we listed as
creditors the holders of the units of beneficial interest on the
theory that they were the ultimate beneficiaries of the rent
and were claimants against the property interest of the lessee
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corporation. The court eventually held with us and sustained
our contention that these certificate holders were creditors.
We filed a Plan which materially changed the terms and provisions of the underlying lease, including the amount of rent
payable and had reduced the distribution of interest applicable to the holders of units of beneficial interest from 52 %
per annum to 3 % per annum. After patient work, we were
able to secure the consents of the holders of more than twothirds of the outstanding units of beneficial interest, and this
phase of the reorganization was assured. Under the Plan, the
leasehold mortgage was eliminated and 90% of the outstanding stock was given to the leasehold mortgage bondholders
and 10% of the stock to our clients. This reorganization has
been confirmed and completed.
The court fixes a classification of the various claims which
have been filed or expected to be filed, which classification is
subject to change upon the objection of a creditor or a stockholder if the objections are sustained by the court. The Plan
of Reorganization which is then filed deals with each of the
various classes of claimants, and it is necessary before the
Plan can be confirmed that the holders of two-thirds in
amount of the claims of the various classes approve the Plan.
The classes of stock are also classified, and in order that a
Plan might be approved it is necessary that the holders of a
majority of each class accept the Plan. Of course, only those
claims and stock interests which have been filed and allowed
need be considered in determining whether or not the requisite number of creditors or stockholders of each class have
accepted the Plan. There is a provision in the Act to the
effect that if creditors of certain of the classes to the extent
of two-thirds or more of the total claims of creditors of that
class do not accept the Plan, their claims or liens may be
dealt with in one of several ways, the most important one of
which seems to be by the appraisal of the property of the
debtor and the payment either in cash to the extent of the
value of their interests, or at their election in the securities
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allotted to them under the Plan. When the Plan is confirmed
the rights of all of the creditors and stockholders dealt with
in the Plan are transmuted into the rights and benefits allocated under the terms of the Plan, although there is a provision in the Act to the effect that even after confirmation,
but before final decree, the court can modify a Plan under
certain conditions.
Of course, one of the most difficult tasks is adjusting the
interest of the various parties in the Plan of Reorganization.
Frequently, Bondholders' Committees have been over zealous in their efforts to get everything for their bondholders
and have frequently forgotten that the proceedings were
originally intended to be for the relief of debtors and not to
relieve the debtors of their properties. In determining whether or not a Plan is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors and stockholders, and is feasible, the court has been given great powers
and discretion. Its decision is rarely upset by reviewing
courts. The extent to which reviewing courts will sustain
such findings as to the fairness of a Plan, is best illustrated
by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Re 620 Church Street Building Corporation,8 which
involved the reorganization of a hotel property. The Committee had negotiated for a long period of time with the
owner and junior interests and was unable to reach a basis
for a Plan of Reorganization. The Committee thereupon had
an appraisal made of the property, which showed it to be
worth less than the amount of the first mortgage indebtedness, and apparently under the circumstances the court found
that the Plan, which granted no participation to the junior
interests including the stockholders, was fair and equitable
and confirmed it. An appeal was taken which confirmed the
District court.
The Church case bid fair to wreck the constructive work
of Section 77B and to rob it of its effectiveness as a relief for
8

299 U. S. 24, 57 S. Ct. 88 (1936), rehearing denied, 299 U. S. 623.
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debtors. A debtor in a state like Illinois, where there is a
long period of redemption, in many instances would fare far
better in the foreclosure proceedings than it would if its property was subject to the jurisdiction of the federal court, and
the Church case was followed. In a foreclosure proceedings
not only the debtor but all of the junior lienors are given an
opportunity to redeem from the foreclosure sale, while under
Section 77B certain creditors can file a Plan eliminating all
interests junior to them including the stockholders, and by
appraising the property can usually establish that there is no
equity and therefore that the Plan is fair and should be confirmed. Most all real estate corporations in the past have
been definitely insolvent, not so much because of the unpaid
principal amount, but because of the vast amount of interest
and taxes which accumulated during the days of the depression.
I do not analyze the Church case to mean that it is necessary for a court to eliminate participation for junior interests,
in the event the appraisal shows there is no security back of
the junior interests, but merely to find that if the court after
a comprehensive examination into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the debtor and its property is of the
opinion that a Plan eliminating the debtor and the junior
interests is fair, that such judgment ordinarily will not be
upset.
In the case of In re 333 North Michigan Avenue Building
9 in which a certiorari was denied1 after the
Corporation,
Church case had been decided by the Supreme Court, the
Circuit Court of Appeals clearly states that a participation
can be given in a plan to junior interests and stockholders,
even though a debtor may be insolvent. The Court said in
part:
"It is further contended by appellant that the Court should have
found as a fact that the debtors were either solvent or insolvent and
that without an appraisal for that purpose it was impossible for the
9 84 Fed. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
10 299 U. S. 602, 57 S. Ct. 194.
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Court to pass on the fairness or equitableness of the Plan. The law
did not require the Court to formally find that the debtors were solvent or insolvent. The record discloses that the debtors were unable
to meet their maturing debts. The fact was never controverted, and
it constituted the basis of petitioner's right to a reorganization, upon
the approval of a Plan which was fair, equitable, feasible, and not unfairly discriminatory. In satisfying itself that the Plan presented had
those characteristics, the Court was required to exercise an informed,
independent judgment, based upon reliable information as to the
character of the property involved, its cost and productivity, the
character and amount of the debtor's indebtedness, and the existing
economic conditions. The record is voluminous and it contains much
evidence in support of the Court's ruling in this respect. . . . Under
these circumstances we cannot say that the Court abused its discretion in not requiring an appraisal, and we were convinced that such
action of the Court was in no manner violative of the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution." (Italics are mine.)

In discussing the question as to whether or not the Plan was
feasible, the Court continued:
"That, of necessity, must depend upon the earning power of the
property and future economic conditions. . . . What the property is,
and what it has produced, is well known. What it will do in the future
is, of course, problematical. Under existing conditions no one can say
with assurance that the Plan will succeed. The District Court thought
that immediate liquidation would be disastrous to all interests, and
that there was reasonable ground for believing that the Plan would
succeed." (Italics are mine.)

Particularly in those states where it is the established public policy of the state, as evidenced by redemption laws or
moratorium laws, to give protection to the owner and the
junior interests, it does not seem to be within the spirit or the
intent of Section 77B of Chapter VIII of the Bankruptcy
Law, which is entitled, "Provisions for the Relief of Debtors," for the court to approve a plan as being fair and equitable which does not grant a participation for such junior interests and stockholders. If a participation is not given to such
interests, no plan should be approved, and, if after a reasonable time no plan giving such participation is accepted, the
proceedings should be dismissed and the creditors and the
debtors relegated to their rights and remedies under the state
laws. Clause 8 of subdivision (b) of the Act provides:
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"If a Plan of Reorganization is not proposed or accepted within
such reasonable period as the Judge may fix, or if proposed and accepted, is not confirmed, may after hearing, whether the proceedings
be voluntary or involuntary, either extend such period or dismiss the
proceedings under this Section, or
ated. .. ."

. . .

direct the estate to be liquid-

Subdivision (f) provides in part:
"After hearing such objections as may be made to the Plan, the
Judge shall confirm the Plan if satisfied, that
1. it is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly in
favor of any class of creditors or stockholders, and is feasible; . . ."

Inasmuch as redemption laws are not dependent on the solvency of the owner of the right of redemption but ordinarily
are absolute, any Plan which does not give recognition to
such redemption rights is hardly fair or equitable and would
discriminate unfairly in favor of certain classes of creditors
and therefore should not be confirmed irrespective of the
insolvency of the debtor.
Arthur J. Hughes.
Chicago, Illinois.

